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A CADILLAC,

CHEVROLET, PICKUP TRUCK, OR
CONVERTIBLE: ENDREwF. V. DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT RE-I AND A NOT-SO-INDIVIDUALIZED
EDUCATION UNDER THE "SOME EDUCATIONAL BENEFIT"
STANDARD
ABSTRACT

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act guarantees a child with disabilities a free appropriate education tailored to the
needs of that child through an individualized education plan. However,
as the Tenth Circuit's decision in Endrew F. v. Douglas County School

DistrictRE-1 demonstrates, courts applying the "some educational benefit" standard fail to properly evaluate the substantive adequacy of an Individualized Education Plan in light of a child's unique needs, abilities,
and circumstances. To ensure that children with disabilities receive the
truly individualized education to which they are entitled, courts, state
legislatures, and Congress must implement measures that encourage
courts to recognize that education comes in all makes and models and
varies according to the particular needs of different children.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
I. BACKGROUND

...............................................
798
.........................................
...... 800

A. Historic Treatment of Childrenwith Disabilitiesin Public Schools
andEarly Legislation
........................................
800
B. The Educationfor All HandicappedChildren Act, the Individuals
with DisabilitiesEducationAct, and the Individuals with
DisabilitiesEducationImprovement Act.......
........... 801
C. Cases Challengingthe Provision of a FAPE Under the IDEJA . 803

D. Board of Education v. Rowley.......................
E. Some EducationalBenefit Standard v. The Meaningful Benefit
Standard
...............................................
II. ENDREWF. V. DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT RE-1................
A. Facts
.....................................
........
B. ProceduralHistory.
..........................
........

1. District Court Opinion
2. Tenth Circuit Opinion.

...........................
...........................

806
808

810
810
811

811
814

III. ANALYSIS
....................................
............ 816
A. Expert Participation
.........................................
818

1. The Importance of Experts and Parents' Disadvantages in Cases
Challenging the Substantive Adequacy of an IEP................. 818

797

798

DENVER LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 93:3

2. Shifting the Burden of Proof to Schools and Allowing Parents to
Recover Expert Witness Fees.........
................ 822
B. Past Progressas an Indicatorof the Substantive Adequacy of an
824
IEP
.........................................
1. Courts' Evaluation of Past Progress .............
..... 824
2. Considering Progress Under the Entire Past IEP ....
..... 826
C. Assessing School Districts'Responsesto BehavioralProblems 828
1. Consideration of FBAs and BIPs in Endrew F. ....
..... 828
2. Amending the IDEIA's Provisions Relating to FBAs and BIPs829
CONCLUSION
..................................
...... 831
INTRODUCTION

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (the
IDEIA) seeks to improve the education of children with disabilities within public school systems.' The IDEIA requires states to provide a child
with disabilities with a free appropriate public education (FAPE), which
is tailored to the specific needs of the child through an Individualized
Education Program (IEP).2
Although the IDEIA puts forth detailed procedural requirements
that an IEP must adhere to, the statute delegates the responsibility for
establishing the content of an IEP to parents and educators.3 Consequently, the Supreme Court's decision in Board of Education v. Rowley put
forth the standard by which the substantive adequacy of an IEP is measured.5 A majority of federal circuits, including the Tenth Circuit, adhere
to Rowley's "some educational benefit" standard, which requires that an
IEP be "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive [some] educational benefits."6 Under the some educational benefit standard, an IEP
is only required to "provide the educational equivalent of a serviceable
1. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (2012) (discussing the
purposes of IDEIA, including ensuring that children with disabilities receive a "free appropriate
public education," protecting children with disabilities, and assisting states and localities with
providing children with disabilities an education).
2. See Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-I (Endrew II), 798 F.3d 1329, 1332-33
(10th Cir. 2015) (noting that IDEIA makes federal education funding to states conditional "on the
states' provision of a [FAPE]" to children with disabilities and that "[IDEIA] ensures a FAPE for
each child . . . [through] the development and implementation of an [IEP]"); see also 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i) (describing an IEP as a written statement that is developed particularly "for each
child with a disability"); 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(A) (discussing how the IEP team, when developing
an IEP, considers "the strengths of the [individual] child" and "the academic, developmental, and
functional needs of the child").
3. See Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1332-33 ("[IDEIA] put in place detailed procedural requirements by which a child's IEP must be created and maintained. . . . [H]owever, Congress 'left the
content of th[e] programs entirely to local educators and parents."' (third alteration in original)
(quoting Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1151 (10th Cir. 2008))).
4. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
5. Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1333 (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207).
6. Id. at 1333-34, 1338 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207); Ronald D. Wenkart, The Rowley
Standard: A Circuit by Circuit Review of How Rowley Has Been Interpreted, 247 W. EDUC. L. REP.
1, 1(2009).
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Chevrolet" and need not "provide a Cadillac."7 However, under Rowley,
even courts adhering to the some educational benefit standard must consider the substantive adequacy of an IEP in light of a child's unique
needs, abilities, and circumstances. 8 Therefore, courts assessing the substantive adequacy of an IEP must not focus just on "Chevrolets" versus
"Cadillacs." Instead, given that every child with disabilities will require
different services to receive an educational benefit,9 courts must ask
whether the child needs the educational equivalent of a pickup truck, or a
minivan, or a convertible.
This Comment argues that, as the Tenth Circuit's decision in Endrew F. v. Douglas County School DistrictRE-] 10 demonstrates, courts
applying the some educational benefit standard often fail to properly
consider a child's unique needs, abilities, and circumstances when assessing the substantive adequacy of an IEP. First, while courts rely on
expert witness testimony to evaluate the substantive adequacy of IEPs,
parents are disadvantaged in terms of retaining expert witnesses. 1 To
have better access to expert witness testimony concerning their child's
unique needs, abilities, and circumstances, parents could request that a
school district perform an independent education evaluation (IEE) before
requesting reimbursement under the IDEIA. Ultimately, however, states
must shift the burden of proof to schools in IDEIA actions, or Congress
must amend the IDEIA to allow parents to recover expert witness fees.
Second, courts often hold that an IEP is substantively adequate if it is
modeled after a past IEP under which a child made minimal progress
even if, considering the child's unique needs, abilities, and circumstances, the progress under the past IEP did not afford the child any educational benefit.12 Instead, courts applying the some educational benefit
standard must evaluate whether a child progressed under the tutelage of
the entire IEP in the classroom, rather than considering progress towards
one goal or objective in isolation. Third, by refusing to consider functional behavior assessments (FBAs) and the substantive adequacy of
behavior intervention plans (BIPs), courts fail to assess all relevant actions taken by schools in response to a child's unique needs, abilities, and
circumstances.13 To ensure that courts properly account for schools' responses to behavioral problems, the IDEIA must be amended to include
detailed requirements as to the contents of FBAs and BIPs and should
7.

Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 459-60 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that while the "Chevro-

let" education offered by the child's private school placement is most likely a better education, "the
[school] is not required to provide a Cadillac, and ... the proposed IEP is reasonably calculated to
provide educational benefits to [the child], and is therefore in compliance with the requirements of

the IDEA").
8.
9.

See infra Section I.E.
See infra note 98 and accompanying text.

10.

798 F.3d 1329 (10th Cir. 2015).

I1.
12.
13.

See infra Section III.A.i.
See infra Section III.B.i.
See infra Section IlI.C.i.

800

DENVER LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 93:3

require FBAs and BIPs in every instance in which a child's behavior
impedes his learning or that of others.
Part I of this Comment summarizes the legislative and procedural
history of the IDEIA, describes its relevant provisions, and discusses the
Rowley decision and how courts, including the Tenth Circuit, have interpreted its requirement for evaluating the substantive adequacy of an IEP.
Part II details the factual background, procedural history, and the Tenth
Circuit's opinion in Endrew. Part III describes how the Endrew decision
demonstrates how courts applying the some educational benefit standard
fail to properly consider a child's unique needs, abilities, and circumstances when evaluating the substantive adequacy of an IEP. Part III specifically focuses on expert participation, past progress as an indicator of
the substantive adequacy of a disputed IEP, and the role of FBAs and
BIPs in evaluating the substantive adequacy of IEPs. Part III also proposes measures that legislatures and courts could implement that would
promote consideration of a child's unique needs, abilities, and circumstances under the some educational benefit standard.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Historic Treatment of Children with Disabilitiesin Public Schools and
Early Legislation
Historically, children with disabilities have been denied access to
public education because of their disabilities.1 4 For example, in 1970, a
significant number of state laws excluded children with mental disabilities from schools, and only one in five children with disabilities were
educated in public schools.1 5 Children with disabilities were forced to
live in state institutions, which provided minimal basic needs, such as
food and clothing, but not education.16 The IDEIA's short title described
the educational challenges children with disabilities faced absent federal
legislation protecting their right to receive public education:
[T]he educational needs of millions of children with disabilities were
not being fully met because(A) the children did not receive appropriate educational services;
(B) the children were excluded entirely from the public school system and from being educated with their peers;

14. Megan McGovern, Note, Least Restrictive Environment: Fulfilling the Promises of IDEA,
21 WIDENER L. REV. 117, 118 (2015).
15.
OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUC. & REHAB. SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THIRTY-FIVE YEARS
OF PROGRESS IN EDUCATING CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES THROUGH IDEA 3 (2010).

16. See id ("In 1967 ... state institutions were homes to almost 200,000 persons with significant disabilities. Many of these restrictive settings provided only minimal food, clothing, and shelter.
Too often, persons with disabilities received care for basic needs rather than education and rehabilitation.").
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(C) undiagnosed disabilities prevented the children from having successful educational experience; or
(D) a lack of adequate resources within the public school system
forced families to find services outside the public school system.' 7
Congress's first response to fostering the education of children with
disabilities was in 1966, when it established a grant program under the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act.' In 1970, the Education of
the Handicapped Act (EHA) repealed the 1966 grant program but replaced it with a substantially similar program.1 9 The EHA provided states
with funds that were required to be used "for programs and projects (including the acquisition of equipment and where necessary the construction of school facilities) which are designed to meet the special education
needs" of children with disabilities. 20 However, the EHA did not offer
more specific guidelines on what the grant money should be used for,
and its primary purpose was limited to pushing the states to provide "educational resources and to train personnel for educating" children with
disabilities. Consequently, the grant program did not significantly improve the educational prospects of children with disabilities. 2 2
B. The Educationfor All HandicappedChildrenAct, the Individualswith
DisabilitiesEducation Act, and the Individuals with DisabilitiesEducation Improvement Act
Recognizing the inadequacy of its preliminary efforts to encourage
the education of children with disabilities, Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA).23 The

17.
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act § 601(c), 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2)(A)-(D)
(2012).
18.
Elementary and Secondary Education Act Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-750,
§ 161, 80 Stat. 1191, 1204 (1966) (repealed 1970); Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179-80
(1982).
19.
Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970); Rowley, 458
U.S. at 180.
20.
Education of the Handicapped Act § 105.
21. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180.
22.
See id. Congress was "[d]issatisfied with the progress being made under these earlier
enactments . . . ." Id
23.
McGovern, supra note 14, at 19. Rowley also notes that the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia's decision in Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C.
1972), and the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania's decision in Pennsylvania

Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), have been
"identified as the most prominent of the cases contributing to Congress's enactment of [EAHCA]."
458 U.S. at 180 n.2. Both court cases addressed the inadequacy of the education of children with
disabilities in public schools under the existing regulatory scheme and recognized that children with

disabilities should receive access to an individualized public education that provides educational
benefit. See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 874 (holding that "the Board of Education has an obligation to
provide whatever specialized instruction that will benefit the child" and by failing to provide the
plaintiffs, who were children with disabilities, individualized educations, "the Board of Education
violates the [District of Columbia Code] and its own regulations"); see also Pa. Assn for Retarded

Children, 334 F. Supp. at 1266 (ordering Pennsylvania schools to provide all children with disabili-
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EAHCA was intended to address the systematic denial of children with
disabilities from the public school system and to provide these children
24
with access to public education. In 1990, Congress reauthorized the
EAHCA under the new name: the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA).25
In 2004, Congress reauthorized the IDEA again under another new
name: the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act
(IDEIA).2 6 Under the IDEIA, federal funding for education is conditioned upon a state's provision of a FAPE to children with disabilities. 2 7
The IDEIA ensures a FAPE for a child with disabilities through the development and implementation of an IEP. An IEP tailors a FAPE to the
specific and unique needs of an individual child with disabilities. 2 8 An
IEP contains, among other requirements, statements of the child's current
education level, specific goals, services that will be provided, and objective criteria for determining if the goals of the IEP are being met.2 9
Schools are required to provide each child with a disability with an IEP

ties between the ages of six and twenty-one access to a free education "and training appropriate to
his capacities").
24.
Andrea Kayne Kaufman & Evan Blewett, When Good Enough Is No Longer Good

Enough: How the High Stakes Nature of the No Child Left Behind Act Supplanted the Rowley Definition of a Free Appropriate Public Education, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 5, 11 (2012); see also McGovern,
supranote 14, at 119.

25.
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 901, 104 Stat. 1141,
1141-42 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400(a) (2012)). The IDEA was also reauthorized in
1997. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17,
111 Stat. 37 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2012)).
26.
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446,
118 Stat. 2647 (codified as amended 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2012)).
27. Endrew II, 798 F.3d 1329, 1333-34 (10th Cir. 2015). The IDEIA defines a FAPE as the
following:
[S]pecial education and related services that-(A) have been provided at public expense,
under public supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meets the standards of
the State educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or
secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity
with the individualized education program required under section 1414(d) of this title.

20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(A)-(D).
28. Id.; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(A)(i)(l)-(VI).
29. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(A)(i)(l)-(IV), (VI)(aa). Section 1414(d) states that an IEP must
contain the following items:
"[A] statement of the child's present levels of academic achievement and functional per-

formance . . . ." 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(1).
"[A] statement of measurable annual goals, including academic and functional
goals . . . and a description of how the child's progress toward meeting [these] annual

goals . .. will be measured," including the frequency of periodic reports. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(ll)-{HIl).
-"[A] statement of the special education and related services . . . based on peer-reviewed
research to the extent practicable, to be provided to the child . . . ." 20 U.S.C.

§ 1414(d)(I)(A)(i)(IV).
"[A] statement of any individual appropriate accommodations that are necessary to
measure the academic achievement and functional performance of the child on State and

districtwide assessments. . . ." 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VI)(aa).
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that conforms to the IDEIA's requirements at the beginning of each
30
school year.
C. Cases Challengingthe Provisionof a FAPE Under the IDEIA
Under the IDEIA, a school district does not have to pay for a child's
private school placement if the school district provided the child with a
FAPE.31 However, if the parents of a child with disabilities believe that
the school district has not provided the child with a FAPE because, for
example, a proposed IEP for a given school year is allegedly inadequate,
the parents could pull the child from public school, enroll the child in
private school, and request reimbursement from the school district for the
cost of private school enrollment. 3 2 If the school district refuses to issue
reimbursement, the parents may request a due process hearing to review
the school district's denial of reimbursement in administrative court.3 3
For a court to find that the school district has provided a FAPE, the
school district and the proposed IEP must comply with the IDEIA's procedural requirements, and the IEP must be "substantively adequate." 34
Under the Supreme Court's decision in Schaffer v. Weast,35 the child,
who is most often represented by her parents, that brings a challenge
under the IDEIA bears the burden of proving that the proposed IEP was
procedurally and substantively inadequate, and the child was denied a
FAPE.36 If the administrative law judge (ALJ) determines that the proposed IEP is inadequate and the public school did not provide the child
with a FAPE, then the school district must reimburse the parents for the
cost of the child's private school enrollment.37 Under the IDEIA, prevailing parents may recover attorneys' fees. However, pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Arlington Central School District Board of

30.
31.
32.

See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(A).
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i)-(ii).
See Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1333 (citing 20 U.S.C.

§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii))

("IDEA allows

parents who believe their children are not receiving a FAPE in state schools [the] option [to] . . . pull
their children from public school, [and] enroll them in private school . . . .").
See id. (discussing the proceedings and results at a three-day due process hearing); see
33.

also 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(f)(1)(A)

(stating that if the parents of a child with disabilities file a complaint

concerning the child's education, "the parents or the local educational agency involved in such
complaint shall have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing").
34.
See Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1334 (describing the "two-step analysis" courts use to determine whether a FAPE as been provided, which asks "(1) whether the district complied with the
Act's procedural requirements, and (2) whether the IEP developed by those procedures is substantively adequate such that it is 'reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational bene-

fits').
35.

546 U.S. 49 (2005).

Id. at 62 (holding that "[t]he burden of proof in an administrative hearing challenging an
36.
IEP is properly placed upon the party seeking relief," and because the party seeking relief was the
disabled child represented by his parents, the child bore the burden of proof).

37.

See 20 U.S.C.

§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)

(requiring schools to reimburse parents for the cost of

private school tuition "if the court or hearing officer finds that the [school] had not made a [FAPE]
available to the child").

38.

20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(i)(3)(B).
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Education v. Murphy,3 9 parents are barred from recovering expert witness
fees.40 If the parents or school district appeal an AL's decision regarding
the provision of a FAPE, district courts and appellate courts use a "modified de novo standard of review."41 Reviewing courts must give "'due
weight' to the administrative proceedings" and the findings of fact from
such proceedings "are considered prima facie correct." 42
When assessing the procedural and substantive sufficiency of an
IEP, courts consider how school districts address behavioral problems
related to a child's disability. 4 3 Under the IDEIA, when a child's behavior interferes with his ability to learn, the IEP team, which includes the
child's parents and special education teacher," must "consider the use of
positive behavioral interventions and supports, and other strategies, to
address that behavior." 4 5 The IDEIA makes reference to two procedures-FBAs and BIPs-that schools could use to address behavioral
problems.46 An FBA is "a systematic process" that identifies the source
and purpose of problem behaviors through an examination of related
"environmental factors." 4 7 An FBA is the foundation of a BIP, which is a
"plan of action for" addressing and eliminating behavioral problems, and
is "dictated by the particular needs of the student." 48
However, the IDEIA only requires schools to "consider the use of'
FBAs and BIPs when a child's behavior interferes with his own learning
or that of others and does not require these measures to be implemented
in every instance in which a child exhibits behavioral problems. 4 9 Rather,
39.

548 U.S. 291 (2006).

40.
Id. at 296-97, 300 (holding that under the IDEIA, "prevailing parents may not recover the
costs of experts or consultants" because while the IDEIA provides "clear notice" that prevailing
parents may recover "reasonable attorneys fees," the statute does not unambiguously state that
prevailing parents may recover expert witness fees).

41.
Sch. Dist.
42.
43.
44.

Endrew II, 798 F.3d 1329, 1334 (10th Cir. 2015) (emphasis omitted) (citing Jefferson Cty.
R-1 v. Elizabeth E., 702 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 2012)).
Id. (quoting Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist., 702 F.3d at 1232).
See id at 1336-38, 1342.
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(i)-(vii) (2012) (noting that the IEP team is composed of, in

part, "the parents of a child with a disability," the child's special education teacher, and "a representative of the local education agency").

45. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1 (Endrew I), No. 12-cv-2620-LTB, 2014 WL
4548439, at *ll (D. Colo. Sept. 15, 2014) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i)).
46.

Perry A. Zirkel, Case Law for Functional Behavior Assessments and Behavior Interven-

tion Plans: An Empirical Analysis, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 175, 175 (2011) (describing behavior
intervention plans (BIPs) and functional behavior assessments (FBAs) as "[a]n interrelated pair of
procedures that have come into favor in the field of special education for proactively addressing the

behavior problems of students with disabilities"); see also 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(k)(1)(D)(ii)

("A child

with a disability who is removed from the child's current placement . .. shall . . receive, as appropriate, a functional behavioral assessment, behavioral intervention services and modifications, that
are designed to address the behavior violation so that it does not recur.").
47.
Zirkel, supra note 46, at 175 ("An FBA is a systematic process of identifying the purpose-and more specifically the function-of problem behaviors by investigating the preexisting
environmental factors that have served the purpose of these behaviors.").

48.
49.

Id.
20 U.S.C.

§ 1414(d)(3)(B)(i)

("[I]n the case of a child whose behavior impedes the child's

learning or that of others, (the IEP team must] consider the use of positive behavioral interventions
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FBAs and BIPs are only required when there has been "a disciplinary
change in placement of the student."50 Further, there are no requirements
regarding the contents of FBAs and BIPs, and there is no standard by
which courts assess the substantive adequacy of FBAs or BIPs. 5 In Alex
R. v. Forrestville Valley Community Unit School District #221,52 the
Seventh Circuit refused to follow the lead of an Iowa hearing officer who
developed a test for assessing the appropriateness of a BIP. 53 Neither
Congress nor the Department of Education had identified the "specific
components" of BIPs and, therefore, had not created substantive requirements for FBAs or BIPs. 54 Considering this, the Seventh Circuit
refused to create such requirements. Consequently, the court declined
to assess the substantive sufficiency of the BIP at issue because the BIP
"could not have fallen short of substantive criteria that do not exist." 56
Other circuits, including the Tenth Circuit, have adopted the Seventh
Circuit's holding that there is no substantive standard by which to measure the contents of FBAs and BIPs. 57
When evaluating the procedural sufficiency of an IEP, courts look
to the IDEIA's specific and detailed procedural requirements that an IEP

and supports, and other strategies, to address that behavior .... ); see also Endrew II, 798 F.3d
1329, 1337 (10th Cir. 2015) ("[Nloting the operant verb [in the IDEIA] is 'to consider,' and not 'to
develop or implement."' (quoting Zirkel, supra note 46, at 186)).
50.
Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1337 ("The statute only requires school districts (and even then,
only 'as appropriate') to conduct an FBA or to implement a behavioral plan if there is a disciplinary

change in placement of the student." (quoting 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(k)(1)(D)(ii))).

"A child with a disa-

bility who is removed from the child's current placement ... shall . .. receive, as appropriate, an
[FBA and) behavioral intervention services . . . that are designed to address the behavior violation so

that it does not recur." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(D)(ii).
51.
See Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1337 (citing Susan C. Bon & Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Does the
Failureto Conduct an FBA or Develop a BIP Result in a Denial of a FAPE Under the IDEA?, 307

W. EDUC. L. REP. 581, 581 (2014)) ("And even where an FBA or BIP is required, the IDEA does
not impose any substantive requirements as to what they must include."); see also Alex R. v. For-

restville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. #221, 375 F.3d 603, 613 (7th Cir. 2004).
52.
375 F.3d 603 (7th Cir. 2004).
53.
See id at 613-14; see also Zirkel, supra note 46, at 203-04, 203 n.179 (noting that the
Alex R. decision rejected the test put forth by the Iowa hearing officer in Mason City Cmty. Sch.

Dist., 36 IDELR 150 (Iowa SEA Dec. 13, 2001)).
54.
Alex R., 375 F.3d at 615 (first alteration in original) (quoting Mason City, 36 IDELR at
199) ("[N]either Congress nor the agency charged with devising the implementing regulations for
the IDEA, the Department of Education, had created any specific substantive requirements for the

behavioral intervention plan contemplated by

§ 1415(k)(1)

or

§ 1414(d)(3)(B)(i).").

55.
Id. ("Although we may interpret a statute and its implementing regulations, we may not
create out of whole cloth substantive provisions for the [BIP] contemplated by [the IDEIA].").
56.
Id. (holding that "as a matter of law" the BIP "was not substantively invalid under the
IDEA" because "the [BIP] could not have fallen short of substantive criteria that do not exist").
57.
See Zirkel, supra note 46, at 203-04 (noting "the reaffirmation ofAlex R. in otherjurisdic-

tions's judicial rulings"); see also Endrew II, 798 F.3d 1329, 1342 n.12 (10th Cir. 2015) ("Although
the parents take issue with the substance of the BIPs put in place by the District in prior years, neither the IDEA nor its implementing regulations prescribe substantive requirements for what should
be included in BIPs. '[T]he District's behavioral intervention plan could not have fallen short of

substantive criteria that do not exist . . . ."' (alterations in original) (quoting Alex R., 375 F.3d at
613)).
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must adhere to. 58 Whether a school district has procedurally violated the
IDEIA also informs a court's "determination of [the] substantive adequacy" of an IEP.5 9 Compliance with the IDEIA's procedural requirements
will generally "assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the
way of substantive content in an IEP.
Even in the absence of a procedural violation, a child could still be
denied a FAPE if an IEP is substantively inadequate.6 1 However, unlike
the IDEIA's procedural requirements, because each IEP must be based
on the individual needs of the particular student, 6 2 the IDEIA does not
contain detailed provisions concerning the substantive contents of a
FAPE.63 Instead, parents and educators are responsible for establishing
the substantive content of an IEP. 4 Nevertheless, federal courts have
interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Rowley as creating the
measure by which courts determine the substantive adequacy of an IEP.
D. Board of Education v. Rowley
In Rowley, the parents of Amy Rowley, a Deaf first-grade student,
sued the school district, claiming that the school's refusal to provide
Amy with a sign language interpreter, and its associated failure to incorporate the provision of an interpreter in Amy's IEP, resulted in denying
Amy a FAPE. 66 The district court agreed with Amy's parents, citing evidence that Amy understood less of what was happening in the classroom
than she would if she was not Deaf.67 By working with an interpreter to

understand everything that was said in the classroom, Amy could have
reached her full potential. Considering this, and defining a FAPE as "an

58.

Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1332-33 (noting that the IDEIA has "in place detailed procedural

requirements").

59.

C.F. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 746 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that the school's

procedural violation of "producing an inappropriately vague [BIP] without producing [an FBA]"
could not be "separated from" the school's "substantive inadequacy" of placing the child in a classroom with an inappropriate student to teacher ratio); see also Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1332-33 (emphasizing "the importance of the" IDEIA's "procedural safeguards" and noting that "[w]hen the
elaborate and highly specific procedural safeguards embodied in [the IDEIA] are contrasted with the
general and somewhat imprecise substantive admonitions contained in the [IDEIA] ... the importance Congress attached to [the] procedural safeguards cannot be gainsaid" (first, second, and

fifth alterations in original) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205 (1982))).
60. C.F., 746 F.3d at 81 (quoting A.C. v. Bd ofEduc., 553 F.3d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 2009)).
61. See Endrew 11, 798 F.3d at 1334.
62.

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

63.

See Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1332-33 (noting that IDEIA "put in place detailed procedural

requirements by which a child's IEP must be created and maintained" but the IDEIA "does not
prescribe the substantive level of achievement required for an appropriate education").
64.
Id. ("Congress 'left the content of [IEPs] entirely to local educators and parents."' (quot-

ing Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1151 (10th Cir. 2008))).
65. Id. at 1333 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982)) ("[T]he substantive
.

adequacy of an IEP is determined by a standard articulated by the Supreme Court [in Rowley]

66.
67.

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185.
Id.

68.
Id. (discussing how Amy "understands considerably less of what goes on in class than she
could if she were not deaf and thus 'is not leaming as much, or performing as well academically, as
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opportunity [for the disabled student] to achieve [her] full potential
commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children," the district court held that the school district had denied Amy a FAPE.69
The Supreme Court 70 reversed, holding that the school district had
not denied Amy a FAPE.71 Through the passage of EAHCA, which was
the statute in effect at the time of the Court's decision, Congress did not
intend to "maximize the potential" of children with disabilities.7 2 Rather,
the congressional intent behind EAHCA was to provide children with
disabilities access to a free public education.73 Therefore, a state complies with its duty to provide a FAPE when it "provid[es] personalized
instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit
educationally from that instruction."74 Further, the education provided to
the child must "be sufficient to confer some educational benefit upon the

..

child.""

Considering these principles, the Court held that the school district
76
had complied with the substantive requirements of the EAHCA. Amy
was "advancing easily from grade to grade" and "perform[ed] better than
the average child in her class."n Further, the school provided Amy with
"personalized instruction and related services" that were calculated to
"meet her educational needs."7 Consequently, because the school district
had also complied with EAHCA's procedural requirements, the Court
held that Amy had been provided a FAPE.79

she would without her handicap"' (quoting Rowley v. Bd. of Educ. (Rowley I), 483 F. Supp. 528,
532 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev d, 458 U.S. 176 (1982))).
69. Id at 185-86 (second alteration in original) (quoting Rowley 1, 483 F. Supp. at 534)
("[The] disparity between Amy's achievement and her potential led the [district] court to decide that
she was not receiving a [FAPE] . . . ."). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second District

affirmed the district court's holding. Id. at 186.
70.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine "[w]hat is meant by
[EAHCA]'s requirement of a 'free appropriate education."' Id. at 186.
71.
Id. at 209-10 (reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals and holding that "Amy was
receiving personalized instruction and related services calculated ... to meet her educational
needs").
72.
Id at 189-90 ("[Tlhe language of [EAHCA] contains no requirement... that States
maximize the potential of handicapped children 'commensurate with the opportunity provided to
other children."').
73.
Id. at 200 ("Rather, Congress sought primarily to identify and evaluate [children with
disabilities], and to provide them with access to a free public education.").

74.

Id at 203.

75.
Id. at 200 ("Implicit in the congressional purpose of providing access to a 'free appropriate public education' is the requirement that the education to which access is provided be sufficient
to confer some educational benefit upon the . . . child.").

76.
77.
78.

Id. at 209.
Id at 209-10 (quoting Rowley 1, 483 F. Supp. 528, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
Id. at 210.

See id. (holding that the "evidence firmly establishes that Amy is receiving an 'adequate'
79.
education," and the EAHCA does not "require[] the provision of a sign-language interpreter" (quot-

ing Rowley 1, 483 F. Supp. at 534)).
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E. The Some EducationalBenefit Standardv. The Meaningful Benefit
Standard
The Rowley decision created a two-step analysis for determining
whether a school district has provided a child with a FAPE.so First,
courts must determine whether school districts have complied with the
IDEIA's procedural requirements.8 1 Second, courts must determine
"whether the IEP developed by those procedures is substantively adequate."82
Rowley also created the standard that courts use to measure the substantive adequacy of an IEP . However, courts cite Rowley as creating
two different substantive standards: the "meaningful benefit" standard
and the "some educational benefit" standard. 4 Some federal circuits adhere to the meaningful benefit standard, holding that, under Rowley, to be
substantively adequate, an IEP must confer a "meaningful educational
benefit."8 5 Circuits adhering to the meaningful benefit standard cite the
following language from Rowley in support of this heightened standard:
"By passing the [EAHCA], Congress sought primarily to make public
education available to handicapped children. But in seeking to provide
such access to public education, Congress did not impose upon the States
any greater substantive educational standard than would be necessary to
make such access meaningful." 86 However, a majority of federal circuits
adhere to the lower some educational benefit standard, holding that
under Rowley, an IEP must merely be "reasonably calculated to enable
the child to receive [some] educational benefits."88 These circuits cite the
following language from Rowley in support of the some educational benefit standard:
Implicit in the congressional purpose of providing access to a "free
appropriate public education" is the requirement that the education to
which access is provided be sufficient to confer some educational
80.
81.
82.

Endrew II, 798 F.3d 1329, 1334 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207).
Id.
Id.

83.
84.

See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
See generally Wenkart, supra note 6.

85.

Id. at I (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207). Wenkart noted that "[tihe Third Circuit is the

only circuit that has utilized exclusively the 'meaningful educational benefit' standard," and four

circuits-the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth-have utilized both standards. Id. at 3, 17.
86.

Scott F. Johnson, Rowley Forever More? A Callfor Clarityand Change, 41 J.L. & EDUC.

25, 29-30 (2012) (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192).
87.
See generally Wenkart, supra note 6 (noting that the Third Circuit exclusively adheres to
the meaningful educational benefit standard, four circuits have utilized both standards, and the
remaining seven circuits, the D.C., First, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, have
exclusively utilized the some educational benefit standard).

88.

Endrew II, 798 F.3d 1329, 1338-41 (10th Cir. 2015) (reconfirming the Tenth Circuit's

adherence to the some educational benefit standard, which "measure[s] . .. whether the IEP is reasonably calculated to guarantee some educational benefit"); see also Wenkart, supra note 6, at 6-17
(discussing application of the some educational benefit standard in circuits that exclusively apply
that standard).
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benefit upon the handicapped child. . .. [T]he "basic floor of opportunity" provided by the Act consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed
to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child.89

The Tenth Circuit is among the majority of circuits that adhere to
the lower some educational benefit standard. 90 For example, in Thompson R2-J School Districtv. Luke P., 91 the Tenth Circuit noted that previ-

ous Tenth Circuit cases have held that a child's educational benefit "must
merely be 'more than de minimis."' 92 Similarly, in Systema v. Academy
School District No. 20,93 the Tenth Circuit held that an IEP must be
"'reasonably calculated' to provide the child with 'educational benefits"' 94 and emphasized that the child's education need not be "guaranteed to maximize the child's potential."9 5 The Tenth Circuit's decision in
Endrew F. affirmed the Circuit's adherence to the some educational benefit standard.96
However, the Rowley Court did not attempt "to establish any one

test for determining" whether an IEP is substantively adequate. 97 Rather,
89.
Johnson, supra note 86, at 27-28 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201). Courts adhering to
the some educational benefit standard also point out that Congress did not change the definition of a
FAPE in the IDEA or IDEIA, suggesting Congress's intention to not explicitly raise the standard for
measuring the substantive adequacy of an IEP to the meaningful benefit standard with its reauthori-

zations of the EAHCA and IDEA. See Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1339 (noting that it is "inconsequential
that Rowley had analyzed the statutory precursor to the IDEA because Congress has maintained the
same statutory definition of a FAPE from its initial inception ... and in each subsequent amendment
to the Act").

90.

Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1339 ("This circuit . .

has continued to adhere to the Rowley

Court's 'some educational benefit' definition of a FAPE.").

91.
92.
720, 727
denied a

540 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1149 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Urban v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 89 F.3d
(10th Cir. 1996)). In Thompson, the parents of a child with autism argued that the child was
FAPE. Id. at 1145. The parents specifically took issue with the proposed IEP's failure "to

address adequately [the child's] inability to generalize functional behavior learned at school to the
home." Id. at 1150. While the ALJ and district court agreed with the parents that the child's IEP was
substantively inadequate, the Tenth Circuit reversed. Id. at 1145, 1148. The court noted that while a
child's self-sufficiency and generalization skills are important and consistent with the IDEIA's
goals, the some educational benefit standard does not "guarantee . . . self-sufficiency for all disabled
persons." Id at 1151. Further, the child was making some progress towards some of the goals and
objectives in his IEPs. Id. at 1153. Consequently, regardless of whether this progress could not "be
transferred outside of the school environment," the child did receive some educational benefit. Id. at

1154 (quoting Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., No. 05-cv-2248-WDM-CBS, 2007 WL
1879981, at *8 (D. Colo. June 28, 2007), rev'd, 540 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2008)). Therefore, while
the Tenth Circuit "sympathize[d] with [the child's] family," the court ultimately held that the IEP
was substantively adequate, and the child was not denied a FAPE. Id. at 1154-55 (holding that "the
school district met its IDEA obligations in this case," given that the child was making "some educational progress," and his IEP was "generated in a manner that represented . .. [an] effort to continue
such progress").

93.
94.
95.
96.

538 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1313 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982)).
Id. (quoting Urban, 89 F.3d at 727).
Endrew Il, 798 F.3d 1329, 1339-41 (10th Cit. 2015) (noting that the ALJ and district

court were correct in applying the some educational benefit standard, since that is the standard that
the Tenth Circuit "continue[s] to adhere to").

97.

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202.

DENVER LAW REVIEW

8 10

[Vol. 93:3

given that the abilities and needs of children with disabilities differ greatly, "determining the adequacy of educational benefits" provided to an
individual child must account for the circumstances of the child's particular situation.9 Consequently, the Rowley Court sought to confine its
analysis to the situation the Court was presented, which involved a child
that was receiving specialized instruction and, most notably, was "performing above average in the regular classroom of a public school system" and "advancing easily from grade to grade." 99 This is consistent
with the IDEIA's requirement that an IEP be tailored to the specific and
unique needs of an individual child.10 0 However, the Endrew F. decision
demonstrates how courts applying the some educational benefit standard
fail to take into account a child with disabilities' unique needs, abilities,
and circumstances when assessing the substantive adequacy of an IEP.

II. ENDREWF. V. DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT RE-1
A. Facts
Endrew (Drew), a student in the Douglas County Public School
System, was diagnosed with autism and attention-deficit/hyperactivity
disorder as a young child.' 0 ' Drew's school provided him with special
education services and IEPs.' 02 Drew struggled to communicate his needs
and emotions and to engage with others.' 0 3 Drew also exhibited behavior
that interfered with his ability to learn,'0 and during his fourth-grade
year his behavioral problems worsened. 0 5 Drew's behavioral problems
led his parents to conclude that he was not making any educational progress under the tutelage of the public school's special education teachers.'1 Consequently, Drew's parents rejected the IEP that the school
98. Id.
99. Id. at 185, 202 ("[The EAHCA] requires participating States to educate a wide spectrum
of handicapped children, from the marginally hearing-impaired to the profoundly retarded and palsied. It is clear that the benefits obtainable by children at one end of the spectrum will differ dramatically from those obtainable by children at the other end, with infinite variations in between. . . . We
do not attempt today to establish any one test for determining the adequacy of educational benefits
conferred upon all children covered by [EAHCA]. Because in this case we are presented with a
handicapped child who is receiving substantial specialized instruction and related services, and who
is performing above average in the regular classrooms of a public school system; we confine our
analysis to that situation."); see also Perry A. Zirkel et al., CreepingJudicializationin Special Education Hearings?: An Exploratory Study, 27 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 27, 47 (2007)
("[T]he IDEA is peculiarly individualized in its orientation, thus running counter to the generalizing
goal of stare decisis . . . .").
See Endrew I, 798 F.3d at 1333.
100.
101. Id.
102.
Id.
103.
Endrew I, No. 12-cv-2620-LTB, 2014 WL 4548439, at *1 (D. Colo. Sept. 15, 2014).
104.
Id. Drew's behaviors included using perseverative language, picking and scraping himself, having an intense fear of dogs and flies, "eloping, dropping to the ground, climbing, loud vocalizations ... and using a new or public bathroom." Id.
105. Id. at *2. During his fourth-grade year, Drew often ran out of the classroom and school
building, "urinated and defecated on the floor," hit computer screens, yelled, and kicked people and
walls. Id.
106.
Id.
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district proposed for his fifth-grade year and enrolled him in a private
school for children with autism. 107
B. ProceduralHistory
Drew's parents, contending that the school district failed to provide
Drew with a FAPE, requested that the school district reimburse them for
the private school's "tuition and related expenses." 0 8 When the school
district refused, Drew's parents exercised their right to a due process
hearing reviewing the school district's denial of reimbursement in administrative court.1 09 However, an ALJ, applying the some educational
benefit standard, found that the school district had provided Drew with a
FAPE and denied the parents' request for reimbursement.n"0
1. District Court Opinion
Drew's parents sought judicial review of the ALJ's decision in federal court.'' The district court affirmed the AL's conclusion" 2 and
found that, while Drew's IEPs did not demonstrate "immense educational growth," they did show that he was making "minimal progress."' 1
The court cited the rule that, under the some educational benefit standard,
[a]lthough the controlling question is whether, going forward, the
IEP proposed by the District was reasonably calculated to confer
some educational benefit, past progress on the IEP goals "strongly
suggests" that when a proposed JEP is modeled on prior IEPs that
had succeeded in generating some progress, the proposed IEP "was
reasonably calculated to continue that trend."' 14
After reviewing the testimony of experts at the administrative proceedings"'5 and thoroughly examining Drew's past IEPs,1 6 the district
107.
108.

Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1333.
Id.

109.

Id. (discussing the proceedings and results at a three day due process hearing); see also 20

U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) (2012) (stating that if the parents of a child with disabilities file a complaint
concerning the child's education, "the parents or the local educational agency involved in such
complaint shall have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing").
110.
Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1333, 1338.
Ill. Id. at 1333; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (providing that a party aggrieved by the
ALJ's conclusion has the right to bring a civil action for review of that conclusion in a district court
of the United States).
112.
Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1333.
113. Endrew I, No. 12-cv-2620-LTB, 2014 WL 4548439, at *9 (D. Colo. Sept. 15, 2014).
114. Id. at *6 (quoting Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1153 (10th Cir.
2008)).
115.
Id. at *8. Drew's parents' retained expert had conducted a neuropsychological evaluation
of Drew after he enrolled in the private school. Id. The expert testified that after a review of Drew's
school records, she could not find any "measurable progress." Id. Further, Drew's IEPs' goals were
"vague ... hard to measure, and the progress reports lacked quantifiable data." Id. The school district retained two experts, both from within the school system. Id. Drew's special education teacher
explained that although the IEP goals were similar from year to year, the "objectives were changed
to accommodate [Drew's] progress." Id. The school district's Director of Special Education testified
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court found that, while some of the objectives in the IEPs stayed the
same from year to year and others were "only slightly modified, . . . the
expectation in the objectives increased over time."'' 7 For example,
Drew's fourth-grade IEP contained the following math objectives:
1) given a variety of coins and dollars, he will accurately count money up to $5.00 and then hand over the correct amount counted;
2) when identifying an object he wishes to purchase, he will be able
to answer the question "is that enough?";
3) he will understand time related vocabulary and concepts as it relates to the calendar;
4) given an analog clock, he will be able to tell the correct time;
5) given a word problem, he will be able to identify which operation
(addition, subtraction, multiplication or division) to use to solve the
problem;
6) he will learn his multiplication facts 6-10; and
7) he will learn his division facts 0-5.118
The proposed fifth-grade IEP that was rejected by Drew's parents
contained the following math objectives:
1) given a variety of coins and dollars, he will accurately count money up to $5.00 and then hand over the correct amount counted;
2) when identifying an object he wishes to purchase, he will be able
to answer the question "is that enough money?";
3) given a word problem, he will be able to identify which operation
(addition, subtraction, multiplication or division) to use to solve the
problem;
4) he will learn his multiplication facts 6-12; and
5) he will learn his division facts 0-5.19
While Drew did not make progress on every goal or objective in the
IEPs, he made progress towards some goals and objectives.120 Therefore,

that ideally, the IEPs would have contained more "entries" and more detailed progress reporting. Id.
The Director also testified that "the goals and objectives" in the IEP rejected by Drew's parents
"contained only 'some slight' changes" from Drew's last IEP. Id However, considering the IEPs as
a whole, "the progress reporting . . . met the required standard." Id.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at *9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The District Court stated:
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the fifth-grade IEP that was modeled after the fourth-grade IEP under
which Drew made some progress "was reasonably calculated to continue
that trend" of progress.121
Next, the court rejected Drew's parents' argument that the IEP did
not sufficiently address Drew's behavioral problems because the school
district did not conduct an FBA nor did it "implement an adequate
,,122
BIP.
Drew's parents did not dispute the fact that, under the IDEIA,
the school district was not required to conduct an FBA or develop a
BIP.123 However, Drew's parents felt that the school district's failure to
properly implement these measures worsened Drew's behavioral problems and prevented him from making any progress on the goals identified in the IEP.1 24 The court disagreed, holding that, although the school
district was unable to "manage [Drew's] escalating behavioral issues at
the time" that he was enrolled in the private school, the district was
working to address those issues.1 2 5
The district court ultimately held that Drew's parents failed to meet
their burden to prove that the school district violated the IDEIA by failing to provide Drew with a FAPE.1 2 6 Consequently, Drew's parents were
not entitled to reimbursement for the cost of Drew's private school tui-127
tion.

I disagree with [Drew's] parents' argument that the modifications were insufficient to
show any meaningful progress. Rather, I agree with the ALJ that Petitioner made progress towards his academic and functional goals in his IEPs and although this does not
mean that he achieved every objective, or that he made progress on every goal, the evidence shows that he received educational benefit while enrolled in the District. As such,
Petitioner's parents have failed to show that the District's IEPs-both past and proposed
for the future-were not reasonably calculated to provide him with some educational
benefit.

Id.
121.
122.

Id. (quoting Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1153 (10th Cir. 2008)).
Id. at *11.

123.
Id. at * 12 ("Whether or not the District failed to conduct a functional behavioral assessment or implement a BIP in this case, at any particular or specific time, is mainly irrelevant to this
decision as [Drew] does not dispute that the IDEA does not require such assessment or plan.").
124.
Id. at * 11. Although Drew's second-grade and fourth-grade IEPs contained BIPs, Drew's
parents alleged that the BlPs were inadequate. Id.
125.
Id. at * 12. The court supported its holding through evidence that the school district "was
in the process of reassessing [Drew's] BIP" when Drew was withdrawn from public school. Id. For
example, the court cited testimony from the school district's expert, Drew's special education teacher. Id. The teacher testified that "[Drew]'s behavioral issues interfered with his ability to learn," and
"her interventions with [Drew]'s escalating disruptive behaviors were not effective." Id. at *IL.
However, Drew's teacher was working to address Drew's behavioral problems, including identifying
problem behaviors and their triggers and scheduling an autism specialist to come in and work with
the IEP team. Id.

126.
127.
(2016)).

Id.
Id. (first citing 20 U.S.C.

§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)

(2012); then citing 34 C.F.R.

§ 300.148(c)
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2. Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit's unanimous opinion began by discussing the
IDEIA's procedural requirements. 28 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the school district's failure to conduct an FBA
did not result in "a substantive denial of a FAPE" and that the BIP sufficiently addressed Drew's behavioral issues.1 29 "As a matter of procedure," given that Drew was not subject to a disciplinary change in
placement, the school district was required to merely "consider the use of
positive behavioral interventions and supports."' 3 0 The school district
was under no affirmative statutory duty to conduct an FBA or to develop
BIPs, and the record contained examples of the school district's "consideration of Drew's behavioral issues."'31 Consequently, the Tenth Circuit
found "no procedural defect that amounted to denial of a FAPE."l 32
The Tenth Circuit then addressed Drew's parents' argument that the
IEP proposed by the school district was "substantively inadequate." 33
The panel began by rejecting Drew's parents' argument that the Tenth
Circuit had done away with the some educational benefit standard and
instead adopted the meaningful educational benefit standard.1 34 The
Tenth Circuit stated that language from the Rowley decision indicated
that the appropriate standard is the some educational benefit standard. 35
128.

Endrew II, 798 F.3d 1329, 1338 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that the court found "no proce-

dural defect that amounted to a denial of a FAPE"). In addition to addressing the school district's
failure to conduct an FBA and Drew's BIPs in the context of the IDEIA's procedural requirements,
the Tenth Circuit also found that the school district's progress reporting deficiencies did not amount
to a "denial of a FAPE." Id. at 1335-36. The Tenth Circuit did stress the importance of "diligent
progress reporting on IEPs" and noted "that the progress reporting . . could have been more robust." Id. However, considering the ALJ's finding that the reporting deficiencies "did not have an
adverse impact on the IEP team's ability to craft and implement Drew's IEPs," the minimal and
vague progress reporting did not result in denial of a FAPE. Id. (citing Escambia Cty. Bd. of Educ. v.

Benton, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1273-75 (S.D. Ala. 2005)).
129.
Id. at 1336. This holding was in response to Drew's parents' "argument .. . that the District's handling of Drew's behavioral needs amounted to a substantive denial of a FAPE." Id "Specifically, [Drew's parents] criticize[d] (I) the District's failure to conduct a functional behavior
assessment (FBA) before implementing a behavior plan for Drew, and (2) even absent the FBA, the
District's failure to put in place an appropriate behavioral intervention plan (BIP) to address Drew's

increasing behavioral issues." Id.
130.
Id. at 1337 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i)).
131. Id. at 1338 (citing R.P. v. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist., 703 F.3d 801, 813 (5th Cir.
2012)) ("Finding the school district complied with federal law where the district considered behavioral interventions and the child had not been removed from her placement due to disciplinary infractions.").

132.

Id.

133.
134.

Id.
Id. Drew's parents' specific argument was that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals's

decision in Jefferson County School District R-1 v. Elizabeth E., 702 F.3d 1227, 1238 (10th Cir.
2012), adopted the meaningful educational benefit standard. Id. The only analysis specific to that
case that Judge Tymkovich considered in making his determination that the Tenth Circuit continues
to abide by the some educational benefit standard was that the Elizabeth E. court mentioned the
meaningful educational benefit standard simply to outline the different approaches taken by other
circuits, not to adopt the heightened standard. Id.
Id. Judge Tymkovich stated that the Supreme Court in Rowley "determined that Con135.
gress's aim had been to set a 'basic floor of opportunity' for children with disabilities by 'providing
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Further, the Tenth Circuit, citing Rowley, previously held that Congress's
intent behind the IDEIA's precursor was "to set a 'basic floor of opportunity"' by providing children with disabilities "some educational benefit."l3 6 The Tenth Circuit has interpreted the some educational benefit

standard "to mean that 'the educational benefit mandated by [the IDEIA]
must merely be more than de minimis."" 37 The Tenth Circuit was bound
by these standards set forth by previous Tenth Circuit decisions, "absent
en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision by the Supreme Court."

38

Applying the some educational benefit standard,1 3 9 the Tenth Circuit
agreed with the ALJ and the district court that the proposed IEP was
"reasonably calculated to enable Drew to receive educational benefits."l 40 First, the panel found that Drew had made sufficient progress
under past IEPs that were materially similar to the disputed IEP to render
the disputed IEP "substantively adequate."l 4 ' For example, "the objectives and measuring criteria" included in Drew's annual goals became
increasingly difficult each year he was in school.142 Despite the fact that
Drew was not reaching his full potential at the public school and was
"thriving" at his private school, Drew was making some academic progress, which is all that the some educational benefit standard requires of
a public school.1 43 Further, the ALJ found that Drew was making pro-

individualized services sufficient to provide every eligible child with "some educational benefit."'

Id. (quoting Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th Cir. 2008)). "Congress did not 'guarantee educational services sufficient to maximize each child's potential."' Id.

(quoting Thompson, 540 F.3d at 1149).
136. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Thompson, 540 F.3d at 1149 (internal quotations omitted)); see also Urban v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 89 F.3d 720, 727 (10th Cir. 1996).
137. Id at 1338-39 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Thompson, 540 F.3d at 1149),
138. Id. at 1340 (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Meyers, 200 F.3d 715, 720 (10th
Cir. 2000)). The court also discussed how it was "inconsequential that Rowley had analyzed
[EAHCA] because Congress has maintained the same statutory definition of a FAPE from its initial
inception . . . and in each subsequent amendment to the Act." Id. at 1339 (citing Thompson, 540 F.3d
at 1149 n.5). Further, post-Rowley Supreme Court decisions favorably cited the Rowley Court's

definition of a FAPE. Id (citing Thompson, 540 F.3d at 1149 n.5). Finally, although Judge Tymkovich acknowledged that other circuits have relied on different language in Rowley to adopt the
apparently heightened standard of requiring "meaningful educational benefit," commentators suggest
that the difference between the two standards is imprecise and negligible. See id. at 1339 n.8 (citing

Sytsema v. Acad. Sch. Dist. No. 20, 538 F.3d 1306, 1313 n.7 (10th Cir. 2008)). "[H]ow much more
benefit a student must receive" for the benefit to be meaningful rather than just "some" benefit is
unclear. Id. Therefore, although the meaningful benefit standard purports to be a heightened standard, the difference between it and the "some benefit" standard is unclear. Id. Further, despite the fact
that there is a split among the different circuits concerning the applicable standard, "which circuit
falls on which side varies depending on which commentator you read." Id.
139.
Id. at 1341. Judge Tymkovich also offered clarification of the standard, noting that under
the some educational benefit standard, "the measure is whether the IEP is reasonably calculated to
guarantee some educational benefit, not whether it will do so." Id.

140.
141.
142.

Id. at 1343.
Id. at 1342.
Id. at 1341.

143.
Id. at 1342 ("The Act does not require that States do whatever is necessary to ensure that
all students achieve a particular standardized level of ability and knowledge. Rather, it much more
modestly calls for the creation of individualized programs reasonably calculated to enable the stu-
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gress towards the goals on his IEPs, and the ALJ's "finding of progress"
was a "factual finding" that the court "owed a presumption of correctness.""1 4
Second, the Tenth Circuit found that the school district and the ALJ
adequately addressed Drew's behavioral issues.1 4 5 However, citing Alex
R., the panel declined to assess the "substance of the BIPs" developed for
Drew throughout his education, as there is no "substantive requirements
for what should be included in BIPs."l 4 6 Consequently, the Tenth Circuit
focused on how the school district addressed Drew's behavioral problems outside of the provisions included in his BIPs.1 47 The panel cited the
ALJ's finding that the school district collaborated "with [Drew's] parents
and other service providers to address [his] behaviors as they arose." 4 8
For example, when Drew's behavioral issues began to detrimentally affect his prospects of advancing to the fifth-grade, the school district
brought in a specialist to evaluate Drew's existing BIP.149
Consequently, because Drew made some academic progress and the
school district worked to address his behavioral problems, Drew's parents did not meet their burden of proving that the IEP was not reasonably
calculated to enable Drew to receive educational benefits.150
Given that the school district and the proposed IEP met the IDEIA's
procedural requirements and that the IEP was substantively adequate, the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that Drew was not
denied a FAPE.' 5 ' Considering this, the school district was not required
52
to reimburse Drew's parents for his private school tuition.1
III.

ANALYSIS

By seeking to confine its holding to the facts presented by Amy
Rowley's education, and stressing the wide array of disabilities students

dent to make some progress towards the goals within that program." (quoting Thompson, 540 F.3d at

1155)).
144.
145.
146.
F.3d 603,

Id. at 1341.
See id. at 1342-43.
Id. at 1342 n.12 (citing Alex R. v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. #221, 375
615 (7th Cir. 2004)) ("Although the parents take issue with the substance of the BIPs put

in place by the District in prior years, neither the IDEA nor its implementing regulations prescribe
substantive requirements for what should be included in BIPs.").
147.
See id. at 1342, 1342 n.12 (declining to assess the substantive adequacy of Drew's BIPs
and instead evaluating how the school district "work[ed] to address" Drew's behavior problems
outside of the contents of the BIPs).

148. Id. at 1342 (second alteration in original) (quoting Record on Appeal at 13, Vol. 1, Endrew
I, No. 12-cv-2620-LTB, 2014 WL 4548439, at *ll (D. Colo. Sept. 15, 2014)).
149. Id.
150.
Id. at 1342-43.
151.

See id. ("For the foregoing reasons, we find the District provided Drew a free appropriate

public education.").
152.
Id. at 1343 ("Because the IDEA provides that reimbursement is due only where the school
district has not made a FAPE available to the child, we find the parents are not entitled to the compensation they seek.").
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may have, the Rowley decision made it clear that an evaluation of the
substantive adequacy of an IEP should take into account a child's unique
needs, abilities, and circumstances.1 5 3 This suggests that, even under the
some educational benefit standard, courts must determine whether the
IEP was reasonably calculated to benefit the child, given the child's
unique needs, abilities, and circumstances.1 54 However, despite the Tenth
Circuit's purported reliance on Rowley,155 its evaluation of the substantive adequacy of the proposed IEP failed to properly consider Drew's
unique needs, abilities, and circumstances. The Tenth Circuit's failure is
indicative of how courts-especially those utilizing the some educational
benefit standard-handle cases in which parents have challenged a
school district's provision of a FAPE.1 56
There are three notable ways in which the Tenth Circuit and the district court failed to take into account Drew's unique needs, abilities, and
circumstances in its assessment of the substantive adequacy of the fifthgrade IEP. First, Drew's parents were disadvantaged in terms of retaining
important expert witnesses.' 5 7 Second, the Tenth Circuit based its decision in part on the finding that Drew made minimal progress towards
some goals in his IEP' 58 despite that, considering Drew's unique needs,
abilities, and circumstances, his progress really afforded him no benefit.
Third, by refusing to consider the school district's failure to conduct an
FBAl 59 and assess the substantive adequacy of the BIPs,1 60 the Tenth
Circuit failed to assess all relevant actions taken or not taken by the
153.
See supranotes 97-100 and accompanying text.
154.
See supranotes 87-88, 97-100 and accompanying text (discussing the educational benefit
standard and suggesting adherence to the principles set forth in Rowley).

155.

See Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1339-40 (applying the some educational benefit standard

because it is the standard adopted by the Rowley Court to assess the substantive adequacy of an IEP
and is also the definition of a FAPE that the Rowley Court adopted).

156.

See Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 2008)

(holding that the child had exhibited academic progress and the IEP was substantively adequate
under the some educational benefit standard, despite that the child could not apply the skills he
learned in school to other environments, rendering the academic progress meaningless outside of the

classroom); see also M.S. v. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Bd., 553 F.3d 315, 320, 327-28 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that the school district's provision of "12.75 hours per week of individual instruction" was sufficient to render the IEP substantively adequate because "the IDEA does not require a perfect education," despite that the child "made little progress while enrolled" in the public school, and his abili-

ties to speak and write were severely impaired); A.B. v. Lawson, 354 F.3d 315, 318, 325-26 (4th
Cir. 2004) (holding that the IEP was reasonably calculated to provide the child with some benefit

because the IEP "focused on the child's difficulties in reading and writing," the school officials'
"professional judgment" were consistent with state law, and the school district was not required to
consider extensive expert reports concerning the child's intellectual ability).

157.

See infra Section III.A.i.

158.

See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.

159.

See Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1342. The Tenth Circuit failed to discuss the school district's

choice not to conduct an FBA during its analysis of whether the school district's responses to Drew's
behavioral problems rendered the fifth-grade IEP substantively inadequate. See id. Instead, the
school district was under no statutory duty to conduct an FBA and, therefore, its failure to do so did
not result in a substantive denial of a FAPE. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
160.
See Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1342 n. 12 ("Although the parents take issue with the substance
of the BIPs put in place by the District in prior years, neither the IDEA nor its implementing regulations prescribe substantive requirements for what should be included in BIPs.").
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school district in response to Drew's behavioral problems. However, the
courts, state legislatures, and Congress could implement solutions that
would ensure that courts properly consider a child's unique needs, abilities, and circumstances when assessing the substantive adequacy of an
IEP.161
A. Expert Participation
Both the Tenth Circuit's and the district court's decisions reflect the
need for expert participation in cases assessing the substantive adequacy
of an IEP, as well as the advantage school districts have in terms of retaining experts. To correct this inequality, parents could request that
school districts perform an IEE. Ultimately, however, states must pass
legislation shifting the burden of proof to schools, or Congress must
amend the IDEIA to allow parents to recover expert witness fees.
1. The Importance of Experts and Parents' Disadvantages in Cases
Challenging the Substantive Adequacy of an IEP
As the Tenth Circuit's decision demonstrates, experts play a significant role in cases assessing the substantive adequacy of an IEP and assist
courts in evaluating a child's unique needs, abilities, and circumstances.
Full-time administrative law, district court, and appellate judges are usually inexperienced in the field of special education and ill-equipped to
unilaterally make decisions regarding the appropriate education for a
child with disabilities.1 62 Consequently, courts often rely on expert testimony when making their decisions regarding the substantive adequacy of
IEPs.163 For example, the district court in Endrew F. extensively cited
testimony given at the due process hearing from Drew's parents' and the
school district's retained experts during its evaluation of Drew's progress
under the goals and objectives listed in the IEPs.16" While the Tenth Cir-

161.
162.

See infra Section III.B.ii.
See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-08 (1982) ("[C]aution[ing] that courts

lack the 'specialized knowledge and experience' necessary to resolve 'persistent and difficult ques-

tions of educational policy."' (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42
(1973))); see also Perry A. Zirkel, Have the Amendments to the Individuals with DisabilitiesEducation Act Razed Rowley and Raised the Substantive Standardfor "FreeAppropriate Public Educa-

tion?," 28 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 397, 416-17 (2008) (comparing hearing officers
that are trained in special education "best practice" with "hearing officers with a strictly legal training" in the context of enforcement of the IDEIA's requirement that IEPs be based on peer-reviewed
research).
See Kelly D. Thomason, Note, The Costs ofa "Free"Education: The Impact of Schaffer
163.

v. Weast and Arlington v. Murphy on Litigation under the IDEA, 57 DUKE L.J. 457, 470, 474 n.101
(2007) (noting that "the presentation of expert evidence is an indispensable part of' parents carrying
their burden of proof (quoting Brief The Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates as Amicus

Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3, Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S.
291 (2006) (No. 05-18))); see also Kathryn H. Crary, Comment, Necessary Expertise: Allowing
Parents to Recover Expert Witness Fees Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 77
TEMP. L. REV. 967, 968 (2004) (noting that using "expert witnesses" in IDEA actions is "necessary").
164.
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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cuit's reliance on expert testimony was less explicit and extensive than in
the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit decision did reference testimony from Drew's special education teacher, who was one of the
school district's experts.

'

Despite the importance of expert testimony, in The Costs of a
"Free" Education: The Impact of Schaffer v. Weast and Arlington v.
Murphy on Litigation Under the IDEA, Kelly D. Thomason discusses
how the Supreme Court's decisions in Schaffer v. Weast and Arlington v.
Murphy disadvantage parents in terms of retaining expert witnesses that
are necessary for parents to carry their burden of proving that an IEP is
substantively inadequate.166 Thomason explains that the Schaffer decision places the burden of proof in an IDEIA action on the party seeking
relief, which is a child with disabilities, represented by his parents.,6 7
Parents thus bear the burden of countering the strong presumption in
favor of the IEP's appropriateness.1 68 Considering the importance of expert testimony, it is critical that parents retain expert witnesses to carry
their burden of proof.' 69 However, in Arlington, the Supreme Court held
that prevailing parents are barred from recovering expert witness fees.' 7 0
Thomason notes that, while school districts have special education experts on staff that can easily and cheaply be retained to testify on their
behalf, parents must seek out and hire an independent expert witness.17
Further, even if parents successfully find a compelling expert advocate,
they must pay exorbitant expert witness fees that, under Arlington, cannot be recovered.1 72 Consequently, Thomason concludes that the combined effect of the Schaffer and Arlington decisions indicates that parents
may not have the resources necessary to carry their burden of proof.17 3

165.

See Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1335, 1341-42.

166.

See generally Thomason, supra note 163.

167.

Id. at 470; see also Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005) (holding that "[t]he burden

of proof in an administrative hearing challenging an IEP is properly placed upon the party seeking
relief," and since the child, who was being represented by his parents, was the one seeking relief, the
child bore the burden of proof).

168.

Thomason, supra note 163, at 472.

169.
See id. at 483 (noting that parents bearing the burden of proving that an IEP is substantively deficient "increaseles] parents' need for expert witnesses").

170.

Id. at 475-76; see also Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291,

297, 300 (2006) (holding that under the IDEIA, "prevailing parents may not recover the costs of
experts or consultants" because while the IDEIA provides clear notice that prevailing parents may
recover "reasonable attorneys' fees," the statute does not unambiguously state that prevailing parents

may recover expert witness fees (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2012))).
171.
Thomason, supra note 163, at 472-73 ("As school districts typically have experts on staff
in the form of special education teachers, child psychologists, and educational specialists, they have
ready access to experts who will support the IEP provided for the child ..... (footnote omitted)).

172.

Id. at 472, 483-84 (discussing how, while the school district's experts are employed by

the school district and would testify on the school district's behalf for free, parents must incur "exorbitant fees for the retention of expert witnesses"); see also Arlington, 548 U.S. at 297-300 (discussing how parents are precluded from recovering expert witness fees).

173.

Thomason, supranote 163, at 483-84 (discussing how parents of children with disabilities

"tend to earn less" than other parents, which "illustrates that the majority of parents with children in
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Data out of Colorado corroborates Thomason's conclusion. For example, of the fifteen due process hearings brought under the IDEIA in
Colorado in 2013, eleven were dismissed or resulted in a finding of no
violation, and only one resulted in a violation.1 74 This is consistent with
Thomason's argument that parents seeking to prove the inadequacy of an
IEP are unable to match the power of the school district's experts and
cannot bear their burden of proof.75
The difficulty parents face in overcoming the power of school districts' experts and proving the substantive inadequacy of an IEP is evident in the Endrew F. decision. Although Drew's parents retained an
expert to testify at the due process hearing, the school district had two
experts testify on its behalf.1 7 6 The school district's experts-Drew's
special education teacher and the school district's director of special education-were both employed by the school system.' 77 Further, the ALJ
agreed with the school district's experts' testimony. For example, the
school district's experts testified that, while the progress reporting in
Drew's IEPs could have been more detailed, the progress reflected in the
IEPs was still adequate.' 78 Similarly, the ALJ held that, although the
school's progress reporting "could have been more robust . . . the absence of more detailed reports [did] not amount to a substantive denial of
a FAPE," and Drew had made some progress towards some of the IEPs'
goals. 79 Pursuant to the standard of review in an IDEIA action, the Tenth
Circuit was required to accept the ALJ's finding that Drew had made
progress towards the goals in his IEPs as prima facie correct.s 0 It is
probable that the school-district-favorable rule relating any minimal past
progress to the substantive adequacy of a proposed IEP undoubtedly contributed to the ALJ's decision.' 8 ' However, experts play significant roles
in IDEIA actions' 82 and the school district had two experts who were
intimately familiar with the provisions in Drew's IEPs, while Drew's
parents had only one expert that merely reviewed Drew's academic recspecial education do not have sufficient income to hire expert witnesses necessary to carry their
burden of proof at IDEA hearings").
174.
EXCEPTIONAL STUDENT SERVS. UNIT, COLO. DEP'T OF EDUC., 2013 DUE PROCESS (2014),
http://www.cde.state.co.us/spedlaw/2013dueprocess (noting that two due process claims were still
active at the time of the survey).

175.

Thomason, supra note 163, at 483-84.

176.
177.

See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.

178.

See Endrew I, No. 12-cv-2620-LTB, 2014 WL 4548439, at *3 (D. Colo. Sept. 15, 2014).

See supra note 115 and accompanying text, for a discussion regarding how the school district's
experts conceded that the progress reporting could have been more adequate, but concluded that
Drew still made progress and the IEPs "met the required standard."

179.
180.
181.

See Endrew 1, 2014 WL 4548439, at *3.
See Endrew II, 798 F.3d 1329, 1341-42 (10th Cir. 2015).
See Endrew I, 2014 WL 4548439, at *6; see also infra notes 206-14 and accompanying

text (discussing how courts applying the some educational benefit standard consider even minimal
progress under a past IEP sufficient to indicate that a disputed IEP modeled after that past IEP is
substantively sufficient).
See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
182.
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ords.1 83 Therefore, it is likely that the ALJ was also persuaded by, and
relied on, testimony from the school district's experts.
Finally, data suggests that parents' inability to recover expertwitness fees not only inhibits them from carrying their burden of proof' 8 4
but also discourages parents from challenging a school district's provision of a FAPE in the first place. "Only five out of every ten thousand
[parents of] children . . . receiv[ing] special education services under the
IDEA request due process hearings."'8 5 Further, the vast majority of
school districts do not experience due process hearings or IDEIA litigation in a given year,' 86 and ninety-four percent of school districts have
never had an IDEIA hearing.' 87 For example, in 2013 only fifteen due
process hearings in Colorado involved disputes under the IDEIA.'18 This
number is negligible considering that there are over ninety-thousand students with disabilities receiving services pursuant to the IDEIA in Colorado.1 89 The significant discrepancy between the number of children receiving disability-related services under the IDEIA and the small number
of due process hearings suggests that parents might be discouraged from
incurring the costs necessary to prevail in a challenge to a school's provision of a FAPE.
Therefore, although experts are an important way in which courts
assess a child's unique needs, abilities, and circumstances, parents cannot
recover expert witness fees in an IDEIA action and often lack the resources necessary to retain expert witnesses. Consequently, parents are
discouraged from bringing actions challenging a school district's provision of a FAPE. When such actions are brought, expert testimony tends
to favor school districts and parents are often unable to carry their burden
of proof.

183.
See Endrew 1, 2014 WL 4548439, at *8 (discussing how Drew's special education teacher
helped develop Drew's IEPs, while Drew's parents' expert merely reviewed Drew's academic rec-

ords).
184.
Thomason, supra note 163, at 483-84.
185.
Id. at 484-85 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SPECIAL EDUCATION: NUMBERS OF
FORMAL DISPUTES ARE GENERALLY LOW AND STATES ARE USING MEDIATION AND OTHER
STRATEGIES TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS 13 (2003)).
186.
Brief for the National Disability Rights Network and the New York Lawyers Interest for
the Public Interest as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 10, Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F., 552

U.S. 1 (2007) (No. 06-637), 2007 WL 2088644 ("90% of school districts had no due process hearings at all in 2004-2005, and only 4% of school districts were involved in IDEA litigation of any
kind."). There also is not a trend towards more due process hearings. Id. ("From 1999 to 2005, the
10% of school districts that had any ongoing formal dispute resolution procedures had a median of
only one dispute per year, a rate that did not change over time.").
187.
Thomason, supranote 163, at 485.
188.
EXCEPTIONAL STUDENT SERVS. UNIT, supra note 174.
189.
COLO. DEP'T OF EDUC., STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES BIRTH: TOTAL STUDENTS SERVED
ON DECEMBER COUNT (2013), http://www.cde.state.co.us/cdespedfin/sped-datareports- I (reporting
on the number of students with disabilities receiving special educational services from school districts in Colorado in 2013).
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2. Shifting the Burden of Proof to Schools and Allowing Parents to
Recover Expert Witness Fees
To lessen the disadvantage parents face in terms of presenting convincing expert witness testimony to prove the substantive inadequacy of
an IEP, parents could request that school districts perform IEEs before
bringing an action seeking tuition reimbursement under the IDEIA.1 90
Under the IDEIA, if the parents of a child with disabilities disagree with
the results of a school's evaluation of the child's education, such as an
IEP9' or an FBA,192 the parents have the right to request an IEE at public
expense. 193 An IEE is "an evaluation conducted by a qualified examiner
who is not employed" by the school district.1 9 4 In Schaffer, the Supreme
Court cited IEEs as procedural safeguards that would prevent its decision
to allocate the burden of proof to parents from favoring school districts.' 9 The Court reasoned that IEEs provide parents with access to an
expert that can evaluate the school's performance and "give an independent opinion."l 96 Therefore, parents have the "firepower" to match
the school district's experts1 97 and can submit the IEE as evidence in a
due process hearing.198
However, in practice, IEEs fall short of providing parents with the
type of expert involvement necessary to carry their burden of proof. If a
parent requests that an IEE be performed, school districts have the option
to file a due process hearing defending the adequacy of the evaluation
instead of conducting an IEE.1 99 Further, even if a school consents to
190.

See Debra Chopp, School Districts and Families Under the IDEA: Collaborativein Theo-

ry, Adversarial in Fact, 32 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 423, 435 (2012) (describing IEEs
as "outside evaluation[s] [that] can be an important way for parents to challenge the expertise of
school districts with independent experts of their own").

191.

See Edie F. ex rel. Casey F. v. River Falls Sch. Dist., 243 F.3d 329, 333-36 (7th Cir.

2001) (discussing attorneys' fees in the context of a case in which parents had requested an IEE in
response to disagreement with some of the provisions and services provided to their child under an

IEP).
192.

See Harris v. District of Columbia, 561 F. Supp. 2d 63, 67-68 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that

an FBA is an "educational evaluation" for purposes of 34 C.F.R. § 300.502, given that an FBA
"plays an integral role in the development of an IEP" and is "fundamental . . . to the quality of a

disabled child's education" (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(1) (2016))).
Chopp, supra note 190, at 435; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(1).
193.
194.
34 C.F.R. § 300.502(a)(3)(i).
Thomason, supra note 163, at 479-80 (discussing how the Schaffer Court "cited the many
195.
procedural safeguards of the IDEA," such as IEEs, that would prevent "carrying the burden of proof

[from] harm[ing] parents"); see also Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 60-61 (2005).
196.
Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 60-61.
197.
Id. (discussing how parents' ability to request an IEE at public expense means that parents
"are not left to challenge the government without a realistic opportunity to access the necessary
evidence, or without an expert with the firepower to match the opposition").
198.
Lewis M. Wasserman, Reimbursement to Parents of Tuition and Other Costs Under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, 21 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL

COMMENT. 171, 210 (2006); see also 34 C.F.R.

§ 300.502(c)(2)

(permitting the results of an IEE to

be "presented by any party as evidence at a hearing on a due process complaint").

199.

Chopp, supra note 190, at 435-36; see also 34 C.F.R.

§ 300.502(b)(2)-(b)(3)

("(2) If a

parent requests an independent educational evaluation at public expense, the public agency must,
without unnecessary delay, either--(i) File a due process complaint to request a hearing to show that
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conducting an IEE, the school often chooses the independent evaluator.200 School districts also have no affirmative duty to implement any
changes based on the IEE and are only obligated to consider the results
of an IEE.20 ' Consequently, IEEs do not afford parents the expert involvement necessary to allow courts to objectively evaluate a child's
unique needs, abilities, and circumstances.
Instead, states must pass legislation shifting the burden of proof to
school districts, or Congress must amend the IDEIA to allow parents to
recover expert witness fees.202 The Supreme Court in Schaffer noted that
states could pass legislation placing the burden of proof on schools in an
IDEIA action.203 Similarly, Ginsburg's concurrence in Arlington suggested that Congress could amend the IDEIA to allow parents to recover
expert witness fees. 2 04 Such legislation would lessen the prejudice imposed on parents by the combined effects of the Schaffer and Arlington
decisions. For example, if Colorado had legislation shifting the burden of
proof, Drew's parents would not have had the burden of overcoming the
testimony of the school district's two expert witnesses. Instead, the
school district would have had to prove that the fifth-grade IEP was substantively adequate. If the IDEIA allowed parents to recover expert witness fees, Drew's parents might have felt more inclined to hire two expert witnesses instead of one, providing them with equal "firepower"
with which to counter the school district's experts. In either scenario,
Drew's parents would have had a better chance to retain experts that
could match the force of the school district's experts, and present convincing testimony concerning Drew's unique needs, abilities, and circumstances.
In sum, while experts play important roles in IDEIA actions assessing the substantive adequacy of an IEP, parents have less resources
with which to retain expert witnesses than schools do. Parents requesting
that school districts perform IEEs are not sufficient to correct the disadits evaluation is appropriate; or (ii) Ensure that an independent educational evaluation is provided
at public expense, unless the agency demonstrates in a hearing pursuant to §§ 300.507 through
300.513 the evaluation obtained by the parent did not meet agency criteria. (3) If the public agency
files a due process complaint notice to request a hearing and the final decision is that the agency's
evaluation is appropriate, the parent still has the right to an independent educational evaluation, but
not at public expense.").
Chopp, supra note 190, at 436 (discussing how school districts "often move to choose the
200.
evaluator themselves or to limit the scope of the evaluation").

201.

Id. at 436; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(c)(1) (stating that the results of an lEE "[m]ust be

considered by [the school district] ...

in any decision made with respect to the provision of FAPE to

the child").
202.

See Thomason, supra note 163, at 485-86.

203.

Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 61 (2005) (declining to definitively condone states legis-

latively placing the burden of proof on school districts, but noting that "[s]everal States have laws or
regulations" already in place that do just that, leaving open the possibility that states could place the
burden of proof on school districts).

204.

Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 307 (2006) (Ginsburg,

J., concurring) ("The ball ... is ... in Congress'[s] court to provide, if it so elects, for consultant
fees .. . beyond those IDEA and . .. regulations already authorize . . . .").
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vantage parents face in terms of hiring experts. Instead, states must pass
legislation shifting the burden of proof to schools, or Congress must
amend the IDEIA to allow parents to recover expert witness fees.
B. Past Progressas an Indicatorof the Substantive Adequacy of an IEP
The Tenth Circuit based its decision that Drew's fifth-grade IEP
was substantively adequate in part on the AU and district court's finding
that Drew made progress under past IEPs with similar goals and objectives as the fifth-grade IEP. 205 However, neither the district court nor the
Tenth Circuit addressed whether the progress indicated in past IEPs resulted in actual progress in the classroom, considering Drew's unique
needs, abilities, and circumstances. Consequently, when assessing
whether past progress indicates that a proposed IEP is substantially adequate under the some educational benefit standard, courts must evaluate
whether a child progressed under the tutelage of the entire IEP instead of
considering one goal or objective in isolation.
1. Courts' Evaluations of Past Progress
As the Tenth Circuit stated in its opinion, under the some educational benefit standard, past progress on the IEP goals "strongly suggest[s]" that when a proposed IEP is modeled on prior IEPs that had succeeded in generating some progress, the proposed IEP "was reasonably
calculated to continue that trend." 206 However, courts are willing to consider very negligible progress, even progress that does not necessarily
benefit a child, as sufficient to constitute "past progress" for purposes of
this rule. In the article titled Rowley Forever More? A Callfor Clarity
and Change, Scott F. Johnson explains that courts using past progress as
an indicator that a proposed IEP is substantively adequate focus on
"whether any progress was made" in any area in which "services were
provided."20 7 Considering this, if a court finds, for example, that a child
made minimal progress on just one goal contained in a past IEP, then the
entire proposed IEP modeled after that past IEP is considered to be "reasonably calculated to" provide the child with "some benefit." 208 Courts

make this holding despite that-considering the child's unique needs,
abilities, and circumstances and his progress under the past IEP as a
205.

See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.

206. Endrew Hl, 798 F.3d 1329, 1341 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v.
Luke P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1153 (10th Cir. 2008)).
207.
Johnson, supra note 86, at 32 (discussing how under the some educational benefit standard, "the court's focus is usually on whether any progress was made in the areas where services were

provided").
208.
Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1341-42 (rejecting Drew's parents' argument that because "any
progress made" under the tutelage of Drew's past IEPs "was de minimis," the fifth-grade IEP was
substantively inadequate because an IEP simply needs to be "reasonably calculated to enable the
student to make some progress towards the goals within [a] program," and Drew did make some
progress (quoting Thompson, 540 F.3d at 1155)); Johnson, supra note 86, at 39 (discussing how, as
long as there is "[s]ome progress towards meeting some IEP goals," an IEP could be deemed substantively adequate even if other IEP goals are not met).
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whole-the minimal progress in one area may not have afforded the
child any benefit.
This is reflected in Endrew F.. The district court found that the math
objectives in Drew's fourth- and fifth-grade IEPs demonstrated the progress he was making, despite that all of the math objectives in his fifthgrade IEP were the same or only slightly changed from the objectives in
his fourth-grade IEP.2 09 For example, the word "money" was added to an
objective, and another objective was slightly changed from learning
"multiplication facts 6-10" to learning "multiplication facts 6-12.,,210 The
fifth-grade IEP also contained two fewer objectives than the fourth-grade
IEP 211 suggesting that, while Drew may have achieved some goals and
objectives in his fourth-grade IEP, he would not be progressing in any
new areas under his fifth-grade IEP. Despite these obvious deficiencies,
which the school district conceded to,2 12 and which the Tenth Circuit
noted, 2 13 the fifth-grade IEP that was modeled after the fourth-grade IEP
under which Drew made negligible progress was found to be "reasonably
calculated to continue that trend" of progress. 214
Considering Drew's unique needs, abilities, and circumstances, it is
clear that very minimal progress on objectives, such as multiplication
facts, may not have afforded him any benefit at all. Drew's behavioral
issues were the most significant impediment to his education. 215 In this
context, past progress on any IEP objective would not necessarily lead to
more progress under a similarly drafted IEP. For example, Drew had an
"especially rocky fourth-grade year" due to the increased severity of his
behavioral problems, suggesting that he received little to no educational
benefit that year.21 6 Considering this, it is unclear how the fifth-grade IEP
209.
210.
211.

See supra notes I 16-21 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.

212.

Endrew 1, No. 12-cv-2620-LTB, 2014 WL 4548439, at *10 (D. Colo. Sept. 15, 2014)

(noting that the school district "concedes that the progress reporting on the IEPs in this case ...

was

lacking in details").
213.
Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1335 (noting that the school district conceded that progress reporting in Drew's IEPs "could have been more robust"); see also id. at 1342 (describing the question of
whether Drew progressed under his past IEPs as "a close case").

214.
Endrew 1, 2014 WL 4548439, at *9 (quoting Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 540
F.3d 1143, 1153 (10th Cir. 2008)); see also Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1341-42 (affirming the district
court's holding concerning past progress and finding "sufficient indications of Drew's past progress
to find the IEP rejected by the parents substantively adequate under our prevailing standard").
215.
See Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1342 ("Drew's behavioral problems had escalated to such a
degree that they were creating a barrier to his academic progress during his fourth-grade year . . . .");

Endrew 1, 2014 WL 4548439, at *2 (discussing Drew's escalating behavioral problems that inhibited
"his ability to function at school and access the educational environment").

216.

Endrew 1, 798 F.3d at 1333, 1337-38 (describing how Drew struggled during his fourth-

grade year and, "[d]espite the school's prior attempts to manage his behavior, during Drew's fourthgrade year his behaviors increased," which left Drew's parents "with what they felt was one choice-to place Drew in a different learning environment"). There is also evidence that Drew's behavioral
problems increased during his second- and third-grade years, despite the Tenth Circuit's affirmation

of the ALJ's finding that Drew progressed academically during those years. Id at 1341 (indicating
that the record supports the ALJ's finding that Drew made educational progress during his second-
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would be "reasonably calculated to continue" Drew's educational progress when it was modeled after the fourth-grade IEP under which Drew
struggled to progress educationally. 2 17 Consequently, the Tenth Circuit
failed to consider whether, given Drew's unique needs, abilities, and
circumstances, the negligible progress indicated in Drew's past IEPs
resulted in actual progress in the classroom.
2. Considering Progress Under the Entire Past IEP
When assessing whether past progress indicates that a proposed IEP
is substantively adequate, courts applying the some educational benefit
standard must consider a child's progress under the tutelage of the entire
past IEP, instead of considering progress towards one goal or objective in
isolation. An analysis of whether, considering a child's unique needs,
abilities, and circumstances, a child has progressed educationally necessarily requires an analysis of an entire IEP, not just part of it. For example, as demonstrated by Drew's behavioral problems, which impeded his
educational progress,218 simply focusing on one IEP goal or objective can
lead courts to hold that the child progressed under the tutelage of a past
IEP, when in reality the child was struggling to gain any educational
benefit and may have even regressed.
Further, a consideration of progress under the entire IEP, rather than
progress on just one goal or objective, does not require courts applying
the some educational benefit standard to consider criteria that only courts
applying the meaningful benefit standard take into account. Courts applying the some educational benefit standard refuse to consider any progress the child made at a private school placement. 219 This would entail
focusing on providing a benefit that "maximiz[es] . . . student potential,"
which is relevant to the substantive adequacy of an IEP under the meaningful benefit standard but not the some educational benefit standard.220
For example, in holding that Drew made progress under the past IEPs,
the Tenth Circuit found evidence that Drew was "thriving" at the private
school irrelevant to the determination of whether the fifth-grade IEP was
substantively adequate.221 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that, under the
and third-grade years); Endrew 1, 2014 WL 4548439, at *2 (discussing how Drew's behavioral
problems increased during his second- and third-grade years).
217.
See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text (describing how Drew's behavioral prob-

lems impeded his academic progress during his fourth-grade year); see also Endrew 1, 2014 WL
4548439, at *9 (describing the fifth-grade IEP modeled after the fourth-grade IEP and how the IEPs
were materially similar).
218.
See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
See supra note 143 and accompanying text; see also Johnson, supra note 86, at 36 (de219.
scribing how "under the 'some benefit' test, the progress the student made at a private special education school, as compared to the progress made at the public school, would not matter").
Johnson, supra note 86, at 36 ("As long as the public school provided some benefit, the
220.
fact that the student made better progress at the unilateral placement . .. would be irrelevant and
characterized as the kind of maximizing of student potential that the school is not required to pro-

vide.").
221.

Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1342.
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some educational benefit standard, the IDEIA does not require schools to
"do whatever is necessary to ensure that all students achieve a particular
standardized level of ability and knowledge."22 2 However, had the Tenth
Circuit considered Drew's progress under the IEPs as a whole, it would
have been clear that Drew was struggling to learn and progress in school,
given his worsening behavioral problems that impeded his education, 223
even without considering evidence that he was thriving at another school.
Lastly, Johnson notes that, under the meaningful benefit standard,
an evaluation of past progress requires that the child meet all or most IEP
goals and make significant progress overall.224 Conversely, under the
some educational benefit standard, courts currently focus on "whether
any progress was made" in any area in which "services were provided."225 However, considering progress under the entire IEP, in light of a
child's unique needs, abilities, and circumstances, does not require courts
to find that the child made significant progress on all or even most of the
IEP's goals and objectives. It simply prohibits courts from focusing on
one goal or objective, such as math objectives, when assessing whether
the child progressed. It also requires courts to not just pay attention to the
written words in the IEP but also to what actually transpired during the
226
course of the child's education.
For example, had the Tenth Circuit
declined to confine its analysis to progress towards only a few select
goals and objectives, the panel would have recognized that any minimal
progress made under Drew's past IEPs was likely negated by Drew's
behavioral problems, rendering him devoid of any educational progress
whatsoever. 227 Under these circumstances, a finding that Drew made no
progress under the tutelage of the past IEPs would hardly be implementation of a standard requiring substantial progress on all IEP goals and objectives.
In sum, in affirming the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit
failed to consider whether the progress indicated in Drew's past IEPs
resulted in actual progress in the classroom in light of Drew's unique
needs, abilities, and circumstances. Therefore, courts applying the some
educational benefit standard must evaluate whether a child progressed
222.

Id. (describing how the IDEIA "much more modestly calls for the creation of individual-

ized programs reasonably calculated to enable the student to make some progress towards the goals
within that program" (emphasis omitted) (quoting Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 540 F.3d

1143, 1155 (10th Cir. 2008))).
223.
224.

See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
Johnson, supra note 86, at 39.

225.

Id. at 32.

226.

The district court focused on how the words in the IEPs changed as evidence that Drew

progressed. See, e.g., Endrew I, No. 12-cv-2620-LTB, 2014 WL 4548439, at *9 (D. Colo. Sept. 15,
2014) (discussing how the objectives in Drew's IEPs had changed). However, had the district court
considered progress under the tutelage of the entire IEP and how Drew actually progressed in the
classroom, it would have been clear that he received little to no educational benefit.
227.
See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text (describing how Drew's behavioral issues
worsened during his fourth-grade year and inhibited his ability to learn).
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under the tutelage of the entire past IEP, instead of focusing on progress
towards one goal or objective in isolation, when assessing whether past
progress indicates that a disputed IEP is substantively adequate.
C. Assessing School Districts 'Responses to BehavioralProblems
The rule cited in the Tenth Circuit's decision that there are no substantive requirements for the contents of BIPs,228 as well as the Tenth
Circuit's failure to consider the school district's choice to not conduct an
FBA,229 conflicts with the Tenth Circuit's discussion of how the school
district addressed Drew's behavioral problems in the context of the substantive adequacy of the IEP.2 30 By failing to assess all of the school district's actions undertaken in response to Drew's behavioral problems, the
Tenth Circuit did not properly consider the substantive adequacy of the
fifth-grade IEP in light of Drew's unique needs, abilities, and circumstances.23 ' Considering this, the IDEIA must be amended to include detailed requirements as to the contents of FBAs and BIPs, and should require FBAs and BIPs in every instance in which a child's behavior impedes his leaming or that of others.232
1. Consideration of FBAs and BIPs in Endrew F.
In its decision, the Tenth Circuit cited the rule that, in order for an
IEP to be substantively adequate, "an IEP must respond to all significant
facets of the student's disability, both academic and behavioral."2 33 Pursuant to this rule, the Tenth Circuit evaluated how the school district
addressed Drew's behavioral. problems in the context of determining
whether the IEP was substantively adequate.234 However, the Tenth Circuit failed to evaluate the substantive adequacy of Drew's BIPs and did
not consider the school district's choice to not conduct an FBA.235 The
Tenth Circuit chose to adhere to the rule that there is no standard by
which courts evaluate the substantive adequacy of a BIP. The Tenth Circuit also refused to take into account the school district's failure to conduct an FBA because the IDEIA required the school district to merely

228. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 129-33, 159 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
231.
The Tenth Circuit failed to address the substantive adequacy of Drew's BIPs and the
school district's choice not to conduct an FBA, which are relevant to addressing Drew's behavioral
problems and his unique needs, abilities, and circumstances.
232. See Patrick Ober, Note, Proactive Protection: How the IDEA Can Better Address the
Behavioral Problems of Children with Disabilities in Schools, I BELMONT L. REv. 311, 333 (2014).
Currently, the IDEIA requires schools to perform FBAs and develop BlPs when the child has had a
disciplinary change of placement but only requires schools to consider these measures when a
child's behavior interferes with his or other students' learning. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
233. See Endrew II, 798 F.3d 1329, 1342 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Alex R. v. Forrestville
Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. #221, 375 F.3d 603, 613 (7th Cir. 2004)).
234. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 129-33, 147, 159, 231 and accompanying text.
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"consider" conducting an FBA. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit refused to
assess two important measures taken, and failed to be taken, by the
school district in response to Drew's behavioral problems that were relevant to the questions of whether Drew's "IEP . . . respond[ed] to all significant facets of [Drew's] disability" and whether the school district
"failed to address" Drew's behavioral issues.2 36 Given that Drew's behavioral problems were a significant impediment to his educational progress, the Tenth Circuit should not have held that the school district adequately addressed Drew's behavioral problems without considering the
substantive adequacy of Drew's BIPs and the school district's decision
not to conduct an FBA. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit failed to assess
all relevant actions taken by the school district in response to Drew's
unique needs, abilities, and circumstances.
2. Amending the IDEIA's Provisions Relating to FBAs and BIPs
To ensure that courts properly take into account the entirety of
school districts' responses to behavioral problems when assessing the
substantive adequacy of an IEP, the IDEIA must be amended to include
detailed requirements as to the contents of FBAs and BIPs. 2 37 Additionally, the IDEIA must be amended to require FBAs and BIPs in every instance in which a child's behavior impedes his learning or that of oth238
ers.
In ProactiveProtection:How the IDEA Can Better Address the Behavioral Problems of Children with Disabilitiesin Schools, Patrick Ober
discusses how the absence of detailed criteria concerning the contents of
FBAs and BIPs influenced the Seventh Circuit's holding in Alex R. that
there is no standard by which courts assess the substantive adequacy of
239
BIPs.
Ober pointed out that the Seventh Circuit declined to assess the
substantive adequacy of the BIP because neither the IDEIA nor other
federal regulations put forth requirements concerning the contents of

236.
Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1342. The Tenth Circuit cited the rule that "an IEP must respond to
all significant facets of the student's disability, both academic and behavioral." Id. (quoting Alex R.,

375 F.3d at 613).
237.
See Ober, supra note 232, at 331-32. Ober notes that in Alex R., the Seventh Circuit relied
in part on the absence of detailed requirements for BIPs in the IDEIA to justify its holding that there
is no standard by which courts assess the substantive adequacy of BIPs. Id. Ober observes how this
suggests that "if ... Congress ... were to implement [specific] requirements for a BIP and FBA,
those standards, if not followed by the school district, could then constitute a violation of the

[IDEIA]"). See also Alex R., 375 F.3d at 615 ("[N]either Congress nor the agency charged with
devising the implementing regulations for the IDEA, the Department of Education, had created any
specific substantive requirements for the [BIP] . . . .").
238.
See Ober, supra note 232, at 336 (proposing amending the IDEIA to require school districts to, "in the case of a child whose behavior impedes the child's learning or that of others," con-

duct an FBA and develop a BIP (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B) (2012))); see also supra notes
50-51, 233 (discussing how the IDEIA currently only requires schools to consider using FBAs or
BlPs when a child's behavior interferes with his or other students' learning).

239.

See Ober, supra note 232, at 331-33; see also Alex R., 375 F.3d at 615.
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BIPs.240 Consequently, Ober noted that, under Alex R., "as long as [a]
school produce[s] an FBA or BIP" when it is obligated to do so, the
school has not violated the IDEIA.241 However, by basing its decision on
how "Congress . . . had [not] created any specific substantive requirements for . . . [BIPs]," the Seventh Circuit suggested that the implementation of requirements concerning the contents of FBAs and BIPs could
lead courts to assess the substantive adequacy of these particular behav-242
ioral interventions.
Further, a violation of the IDEIA's detailed procedural requirements
informs a court's analysis of whether an IEP is substantively inadequate. 243 Therefore, if the IDEIA was amended to include detailed requirements as to the contents of FBAs or BIPs, and required FBAs and
BIPs in every instance in which a child's behavior interferes with learning, courts would not only be more likely to find a denial of a FAPE
based on violations of these additional procedural requirements but the
substantive adequacy of BIPs and FBAs would be called in to question
more often as well.
Had these amendments been in place, the Tenth Circuit might have
been prompted to assess the substantive adequacy of Drew's BIPs. 24
Further, because Drew's behavior impeded his learning and that of others, the school district would have been required to conduct an FBA and
to develop BIPs. Not only would Drew have received the benefit of an
FBA but any procedural violation of the more detailed requirements concerning the contents of the FBA and BIPs also would have informed the
analysis of the substantive adequacy of these behavioral interventions
and the fifth-grade IEP in general.2 45 Consequently, the Tenth Circuit
would have more thoroughly examined the school district's response to
Drew's behavioral problems in the substantive provisions of the BIPs
during its analysis of the substantive adequacy of the fifth-grade IEP,
instead of focusing only on actions the school district took outside of the
contents of the BIPs. For example, in holding that the school district's
efforts to address Drew's behavioral problems did not render the fifthgrade IEP substantively inadequate, the Tenth Circuit relied heavily on
240. Ober, supra note 232, at 332; see also Alex R., 375 F.3d at 615 ("[T]he specific components of the [BIP] are not identified either in the federal statute or the regulations." (quoting Mason
City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 36 IDELR 193, 199 (Iowa SEA Dec. 13, 2001))).
241. Ober, supra note 232, at 332; see also Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1337-38 (holding that the
school district did not violate the IDEIA because there are no "substantive requirements as to what
[BIPs] must include," and the school developed a BIP when Drew's behavior impeded his education).
242. Ober, supra note 232, at 322 (quoting Alex R., 375 F.3d at 615).
243. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
244. Ober discusses how the Alex R. court's reasoning indicates that had detailed requirements
been in place, the Seventh Circuit may have been prompted to evaluate the substantive adequacy of
the BIP in question. See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text. Given the Tenth Circuit's
reliance on Alex R.'s rule that there is no standard by which courts assess the substantive adequacy
of a BIP, the Tenth Circuit may also have been inclined to evaluate the contents of Drew's BlPs.
245. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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evidence of the school district's efforts to bring in a behavioral specialist. 2 46 However, had the panel also considered the school district's failure
to conduct an FBA and the substantive contents of the BIPs as relevant
evidence, the school district's efforts to bring in a specialist may have
been overcome by, for example, insufficiencies in the content of the BIPs
or the harm the school's failure to conduct an FBA inflicted upon Drew's
educational progress. The Tenth Circuit would have considered all relevant actions taken or not taken by the school district in response to
Drew's unique needs, abilities, and circumstances, instead of focusing
only on a few of the school district's actions in response to his behavioral
problems.
In sum, the Tenth Circuit's failure to consider the substantive contents of Drew's BIPs and the school district's choice not to conduct an
FBA conflicted with its discussion of how the school district addressed
Drew's behavioral problems and resulted in an inadequate assessment of
the fifth-grade IEP in light of Drew's unique needs, abilities, and circumstances. In order to properly consider all relevant actions school districts
take in response to a child's behavioral problems, the IDEIA must be
amended to include detailed requirements as to the contents of FBAs and
BIPs, and should require FBAs and BIPs when a child's behavior impedes his learning or that of others.
CONCLUSION

The IDEIA's requirement that a public school system tailor a FAPE
to the specific needs of a child with disabilities through an IEP247 is essential to ensuring that children with disabilities have access to an adequate education. However, the Tenth Circuit in Endrew F. demonstrates
how courts applying the some educational benefit standard fail to properly consider a child's unique needs, abilities, and circumstances when
evaluating the substantive adequacy of an IEP. The Tenth Circuit thought
that educations for children with disabilities were offered in only two
makes and models: either a Chevrolet or a Cadillac. In order to give children with disabilities the education they are entitled to under the IDEIA
and Rowley, courts, state legislatures, and Congress must implement solutions encouraging courts to recognize that appropriate educations
comes in all different kinds of makes and models.
To ensure that courts consider a child's unique needs, abilities, and
circumstances when evaluating the substantive adequacy of an IEP,
states should enact legislation that shifts the burden of proof to school
districts. Further, courts applying the some educational benefits standard
must evaluate whether a child progressed under the tutelage of the entire
past IEP, instead of considering progress towards one goal or objective in
246.

See Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1341-42.

247.

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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isolation. Lastly, to encourage courts' consideration of FBAs and BIPs,
the IDEIA must be amended to include detailed requirements as to the
contents of FBAs and BIPs and require these measures when a child's
behavior interferes with learning in the classroom.
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